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The Limits of the Welfare State:
New York City's Response to Homelessness
JOEL BLAU

State University of New York at Stony Brook
School of Social Welfare

This research examines New York City's response to the growth of the
homeless population. Reviewing the six policies that constitute the
city's response, it identifies two patterns. These patterns-cost-reduction and preparationfor work-are then explored as examples of the
constraints on the development of policies for the homeless. Finally,
three theories of the welfare state are advanced to analyze these constraints and illuminate New York City's behavior.

Homelessness has become a prominent social problem. The
population has grown rapidly, and this growth has been accompanied by a proliferation of policies, as different localities, states,
and the federal government seek to shape a response. New York
City's response has been one of the more intricate and complex.
New York has the largest homeless population; its government
provides the vast majority of beds. Yet despite having made the
best effort of any unit in the American public sector, the number
of homeless continue to increase. New York is certainly different, and care should obviously be exercised before any comparisons are made. Nonetheless, a case study of the inadequacy
of New York's response is well worthwhile. By reviewing what
the city did and did not do, it is possible to examine how political and economic factors constrain the welfare state and impede
the development of social policy in this country.
New York City's homeless population first began to grow
during the 1970s. The economy slowed; low-income housing
became harder to obtain; and in the absence of adequate mental
health services, many deinstitutionalized people walked the
streets. Together, these three causes seem to have had a synergistic effect. As a result, homelessness, an urban phenomenon
that had once been confined to the Bowery, was pushed over the
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threshold into the category of a compelling social problem. New
York City was then forced to respond.
New York City's Six Policy Responses
Analysis suggests that the city's response consisted of six
policies. These policies are (a) resistance to the implementation
of a court decree granting a right to housing; (b) a preference for
large over small shelters; (c) an emphasis on temporary rather
than permanent housing; (d) encouragement of the work ethic,
if not actual work; (e) partial differentiation of the homeless
population; and (f) together with New York State, street outreach rather than long-term bed provision for the homeless mentally ill. Each of these policies must be more completely described
in order to clarify some patterns in the welfare state's behavior.
Resistance to the Implementation of a Court Decree Granting a
Right to Housing
In 1979, the Supreme Court of the State of New York issued
a preliminary injunction ordering New York City to provide
shelter to every man who requested it. Two years later, the city
signed a consent decree in which it promised to provide minimally decent shelter if the advocates for the homeless would drop
their demand that men's shelters be community-based (Hopper
and Cox, 1982).
New York City has subsequently resisted the full implementation of this decree. As a consequence, advocates have had to
go to court more than 30 times to enforce its terms (Daley, 1987).
They have sued about overcrowding, the city's transportation
policy, and the adequacy of shelter services. In addition, they
have also had to wage a long battle so that the consent decree
for men could be used as a legal precedent for the shelter rights
of women and families (Coalition for the Homeless, Undated,
p. 3; Koch, 1987, p. 22).
The city's reluctance has effectively undermined much of the
decree's value. New York's homeless won a victory when they
secured a right to shelter. yet the value of that right is significantly diluted when the city seeks to fulfill its responsibilities
by housing 700 people in a shelter intended for a smaller number. The court may award rights, but it is only the city that, by
allocating funds, can give those rights any real meaning.

Homelessness

A Preference for Large Shelters Over Small Ones
New York City has regularly demonstrated a preference for
large rather than small shelters. In July, 1986, for example, only
2 of 21 shelters-the Park Slope and Kingsbridge Armorieshad fewer than 100 residents. In contrast, the largest shelterthe Fort Washington Armory had a nightly census of 784 men,
and 9 other shelters averaged more than 300 people (HRA, July,
1986). New York City secured the right under the consent decree
to house its homeless in large shelters. It has fought the implementation of plaintiff's rights obtained through this decree. But
it has exercised its own right to the fullest.
Even widespread community opposition has not deterred it.
Some neighborhoods have expressed their willingness to accept
a small community-based shelter (Hopper et al. 1982; Biber,
1984). Yet virtually everyone becomes adamantly opposed when
faced with the prospect of a large institution. Any large institution changes the character of a neighborhood. When that institution is full of homeless men, the change is usually resisted
with all the political resources the community can command.
New York City's commitment to this policy has been the
subject of much speculation. The Koch Administration maintains that it would be politically impossible to scatter enough
small shelters to house the population (Human Resources
Administration, 1984). But since living in a large institution is
less attractive to the homeless, many critics suspect that its deterrent value is one reason the city continues to insist upon them
(Hopper and Hamberg, 1985; Hayes, 1985).
An Emphasis on Temporary Rather Than PermanentHousing
Closely related to the city's preference for large shelters is its
attempt to use temporary facilities to address the homeless' need
for housing. Armories and welfare hotels are the best examples
of these temporary facilities, but the city has also converted
schools, hospitals, and factories into housing that is equally
makeshift. Temporary facilities for a "temporary population":
well into the 1980s, New York operated on the assumption that
the growth in the homeless population was merely a passing
emergency.
More recently, though, the problem's persistence has compelled the municipal government to alter this assumption. The
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clear need for some better temporary housing has resulted in
innovative programs such as Andrew Cuomo's Brooklyn apartment building for 200 homeless families (Schmalz, 1987). This
transitional facility has better living conditions than a typical
welfare hotel, and the relative stability of its environment should
help the residents in their search for permanent housing.
Their prospects, though, are not good. There are more than
5000 homeless families in New York City, an overall vacancy
rate of just slightly over 2%, and an especially acute shortage of
low-income housing. New York City public housing, for example, has a wait of 18 years: if you wanted a larger apartment in
public housing because you were bringing an infant home from
the hospital, that apartment would be available about the time
the infant-now a teenager-had left for college. Transitional
facilities like the Cuomo apartments obviously serve a vital need.
But they cannot fulfill their intended function unless their residents can find adequate housing.
A Policy of Encouraging the Work Ethic, If Not Actual Work
Another major city policy revolves around the enforcement
of work norms. The Koch Administration has implemented two
kinds of programs for this purpose. One, the Work Experience
Program, pays $12.50 a week to 3000 homeless residents for 20
hours of maintenance and janitorial work in the city's shelters,
parks, and subways. A second, typified by the Shelter Employment and Housing Project, found 727 jobs for the homeless in
the competitive labor market over 2 years (Valleau, 1987). Virtually no money has been allocated for job training.
The omission of job training leaves a revealing policy mix.
Either the residents are kept busy on a minimum stipend, or
they get a SEHP job placement. SEHP jobs usually pay less than
$5 an hour (Shelter Employment and Housing Project, 1986).
Very few people will be able to find housing outside the shelter
on this salary.
Job training would undoubtedly be expensive. But it would
also upgrade their employment skills. Without job training, there
is too little real paid work for too few people. New York City
says that its policies are designed to make the homeless selfsufficient. Yet what its policies really show is that there is a big
difference between work and the enforcement of work norms.

Homelessness

A Policy of Partial Differentiation of the Homeless Population
Since the late 1970s, New York City has gradually moved
from an undifferentiated to a partially differentiated conception
of the homeless. Its policies illustrate this shift. What was once
seen as an amorphous and undifferentiated mass is now subdivided into a number of subpopulations, each with its own
special characteristics. Most of this differentiation has occurred
through the development and more careful targeting of services.
By distinguishing between the employable and nonemployable
subgroupings, work programs provide for one cross-section of
the population. Shelter-based Community Support Systems for
the homeless mentally ill provide for another. Inasmuch as both
of these initiatives are relatively new, they demonstrate the city's
recognition that some benefits flow from making these kinds of
distinctions.
Yet this change has had its limits. In the work programs, for
example, the city merely separates the nonemployables and the
employables. Without a job training program requiring specific
skills, however, it makes little attempt to classify them further.
Similarly, while it is aware that the homeless mentally ill are
scattered throughout the shelter system, it has placed CSS teams
in only about one-third of the city's shelters (Barbanel, 1987).
Further evidence of this pattern is found in the city's 1986
shelter initiative (New York City, 1986). On the one hand, the
city proposed a shelter system with a relatively high degree of
differentiation, one that offers separate housing for the elderly,
employables, substance abusers, and the mentally ill. On the
other, all this housing is to be provided in shelters whose size
do not enable staff to develop a helping relationship. Subsequently, the city cut shelter staff for its FY' 87 budget, leaving
only understaffed large shelters to implement the plan. Significant differentiation cannot occur under these circumstances.
A Policy of Street Outreach rather Than Bed Provisionfor the
Homeless Mentally Ill
Another distinct pattern is evident in the city's mental health
policy. With hospital psychiatric wards at 100% of capacity,
there is a shortage of acute care beds. New York State also has
only about one-third of the 10,000 long-term supportive residences it needs (Barbanel, 1985). And while the city has used
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Community Support System funds to provide mental health services to some shelters, its street outreach teams are clearly the
most innovative programmatic development for the homeless
mentally ill.
Evaluations of these programs have generally arrived at a
consensus. While these programs were considered quite effective in engaging homeless people on the street, several studies
have found that once they were off the street, there was a dearth
of long-term services to which they could be referred (Barrow
and Lovell, 1982, 1983). It is significant that the mental health
system should have evolved in this particular manner.
Together, all these policies. epitomize crisis management and
a residual approach. Resisting the implementation of court orders, New York City has waited until the immediate needs of
the homeless became absolutely critical. Then, emphasizing their
transient status, it has opened large, temporary shelters, often
against the community's will. Without job training, its work
programs address the symptoms rather than structural dimensions of the homeless' unemployment; without other referral options, its street outreach teams remove only the most conspicuous
evidence of the homeless mentally ill. True, New York City has
moved toward greater differentiation of the homeless population. But undermined by staff reductions, its own policy of crisis
management has remained intact.
The Policies Reconceptualized
Laying out the attributes of these policies enables us to explain them at the next level of abstraction. From this perspective,
the city really has two sets of policies. One set is directed at
reducing the cost of maintaining the dependent population. The
other set is intended to keep the potentially employable part of
the homeless population ready for work and to place some small
fraction of them in competitive jobs.
Reduction of the Cost
All the policies except those that are explicitly work-related
can be identified as part of the effort to reduce the cost of maintaining the dependent population. Resistance to implementation
of the court order granting housing represents an attempt to slow
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the development of an increasingly costly program. Similarly,
the city prefers large over small shelters because large shelters
achieve some economies of scale and are cheaper to operate. By
keeping the homeless in armories and other large, temporary
shelters, the city has effectively deterred both the homeless as
well as other poor people from relying on the public sector for
permanent housing. And while New York City began to differentiate among the homeless, it had to fall back on a cheaper, less
differentiated policy when, despite all the extraneous social costs,
it could not afford the necessary shelter staff. Lastly, in the category of cost reduction and savings, there is the city's policy
toward the homeless mentally ill. Within the context of the state's
inadequate financing for acute and chronic care beds, the city
has certainly funded programs that get the most disruptive of
the homeless mentally ill off the street. However, its failure to
provide sufficient long-term services suggests that once they are
off the street, the principle of cost-reduction still holds.
Work-Ready and/or Working
The driving force behind these five policies is the desire to
save money. The city's work programs, by contrast, seem to be
otherwise impelled. If the purpose of the Work Experience Program is to keep the homeless who are potentially employable
job-ready, the function of programs like the Shelter Employment
and Housing Project is to increase the competition for low-paying jobs. Hence, in this interpretation, the city's policies keep a
sizeable portion of the homeless population primed for the demands of the labor market and prepared to work. But by increasing the total supply of labor, they also serve to deflate the
cost of wages, especially among low-paying jobs.
Minimizing the Cost, Maximizing the Use
New York City's management of the homeless may therefore
be described as a push-pull mechanism. This push-pull mechanism consists of an effort to manage the relationship between
the underclass and the working poor. New York City's policies
of deterrence keep the cost of maintenance down and push some
of the homeless into the labor market; its employment programs
exist to tug at those who demonstrate both a capability and a
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willingness for work. If the purpose of these policies is to manage the relationship between the underclass and the working
poor, its net effect is to reduce both the cost of maintenance and
the cost of labor.
Minimizing the cost of the homeless and maximizing their
use: this is, in essence, what New York City has done in response to the growth of the homeless population. In some ways,
of course, such a response is not unusual. Social policies have
always intervened in the relationship between nonworking poor
and the labor market. By giving more or less in response to
changing political and economic conditions, they have sought
to alter the equation of factors that incline some people to choose
work or dependency. The elements of this choice are never work
or dependency alone, but rather their comparative benefits. Thus,
New York City may have had to grant a right to shelter in order
to address the problem of homelessness. But when the shelter
population grew dramatically, work programs were necessary
to bring the comparative benefits of work and dependency back
into line.
Theories of the Welfare State
This analysis of the relationship between homelessness and
social policy has significant implications. It suggests that there
are limits to social reform-limits to what the American welfare
state can, and cannot, do. In fact, there are several theories of
the welfare state that reenforce and enrich this interpretation.
Three, in particular, are especially relevant. They are (a) the
need to maintain business confidence, (b) the concept of relative
autonomy, and (c) the notion that maintenance of the dependent
population and reproduction of the labor force constitute one of
the welfare state's primary functions. Each of these theories will
be discussed in turn.
The Need to Retain Business Confidence
The first theory is predicated on the need to retain business
confidence. It is derived from the premise that the policies of the
municipal government toward the homeless are rooted in the
relationship between that government and a private enterprise
economy. As an institutional entity, New York City's govern-
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ment depends for its functioning on the economy's health. This
statement is true both generally and as a matter of practical politics. In a general sense, of course, taxes from the economy finance the government. Beyond that fact, though, as a matter of
practical politics, a failing economy is likely to result in an electoral debacle for the city's political leadership. For this reason,
New York must always retain the confidence of business (Block,
1977).
Yet the need to retain business confidence creates its own
conflicts. For, as James O'Connor argues in The Fiscal Crisis of
the State (1973), the welfare state performs two essentially contradictory functions, namely, accumulation and legitimization.
While the state, he suggests, must foster conditions favorable to
the accumulation of capital, it cannot function in a manner that
casts doubt on the legitimacy of the society.
Obviously, there is a lot of tension between these two responsibilities. Too much attention to the issue of accumulation
undermines social harmony. But social harmony won at the price
of many social benefits can limit the potential for capital accumulation. The state must therefore balance these responsibilities,
shifting its attention from one to the other as the occasion
demands.
This need goes a long way toward explaining the city's choice
of policies. In an effort to compete for investment with other
cities, New York sought to change its image as a welfare capital.
In an attempt to create a hospitable climate for business, New
York tried to reduce dependency upon the government. Thus,
when New York City responded to the homeless, it opened shelters that would get the population off the street. These shelters
were the cheapest, temporary solution to the problem. They
were the solution demanding the fewest tax dollars relative to
the problem's size.
This cost-effective method of managing the homeless population is part of New York City's "accumulation" function. New
York must create a favorable environment for the conduct of
business, and it must create this environment in an economy
where some other locales can offer stiff competition. By providing a service to the homeless while sharply circumscribing its
nature and extent, the public sector's response to the problem
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squashes any expectation of further dependence upon it. Hence
the delivery of the service implies its own limit: a shelter bed
is no harbinger of permanent housing.
If these constraints on the size of the public sector are necessary for the purpose of accumulation, they are counterbalanced
by pressures for fairness and social harmony. This is the legitimization side of the equation, whose expression in New York
City took a somewhat rarefied form. There was no mass protest
demanding services for the homeless. Instead, an inequity was
redressed by a ruling of the judiciary in favor of the advocates'
legal arguments. Popular opinion was also an important factor,
because the homeless' disruption of public space made people
feel that something had to be done about them.
The Relative Autonomy of the Welfare State
The second important theory that helps to explain New York
City's behavior is the concept of the state's autonomy. Business,
obviously, is not merely one undifferentiated interest. The requirements for retaining business confidence may therefore be
quite different for New York City's fading industrial plant than
they are for the real estate sector. Industries want a labor force
that can obtain affordable, local housing; the real estate sector
wants the very kind of freedom in the marketplace that drives
up the cost of housing and creates homelessness. A measure of
state autonomy is required to reconcile these different business
interests, as well as looking out for the system's long-term stability by, among other things, knowing when there is a need to
enact a social reform.
This concept can even be carried a step further. When a
significant degree of autonomy is granted to the state, it becomes
so detached from the direct influence of the business class that
it appears to be acting out of its own self-interest (Block, 1977;
Skocpol, 1980). According to this view, business is not conscious
of its interests as a class: businessmen may be conscious of their
own individual interests, but they do not know how to reproduce the social order. Since state managers possess this skill, the
interests of business and the state converge. Business needs the
state to reproduce the social order, and the state needs business
because it is dependent on a healthy economy.
This perspective has direct implications for New York City's
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response to the growth of the homeless population. While the
municipal government's policies flow from its relationship with
the private sector, it is not necessary to argue that it enacted
these policies at the explicit direction of the business class. Instead, New York City's policies are clearly the product of a basic
political and economic constraint that limits the possibilities of
the American welfare state. As a result of the strength of business relative to the forces opposing it, too much cannot be given
to those who do not succeed on the market's terms, and the
standard of social benefits for housing, health care, and income
security is set comparatively low. Because this constraint is so
profoundly structural, any response to homelessness as a social
problem will surely run up against it.
Maintenance of the Dependent Population, Reproduction of the
Labor Force
The third theory that helps to illuminate New York City's
response ascribes yet another function to the welfare state. This
function can be formulated most accurately as the reproduction
of labor and the maintenance of the nonworking population
(Gough, 1979; Moscovitch, 1980; Dickinson and Russell, 1986).
All social programs, except those for the permanently retired,
help to reproduce labor. Some, such as a health program for
those who are now working, reproduce current labor, while
others reproduce a future labor force, either by helping children
or maintaining a part of the dependent population until jobs are
available. In a welfare state organized around universal rather
than selective principle-one where full benefits and services
are provided even if the recipient is working, some programs
may even do both.
Since New York City's response to homelessness is hardly
modeled on universal principles, its maintenance of the nonworking population is evident in the social benefits it provides
to the homeless. This is especially true of the city's programs for
homeless individuals, whom the benefits sustain until some
fraction return to work. Consequently, these benefits to individuals serve to reproduce labor, much as assistance to homeless
families both maintains them and preserves the possibility of
their children participating in a future workforce.
These three theories of the welfare state share an emphasis
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on the importance of business' role, but they are not perfectly
coterminous. Arguments about business confidence differ in the
degree of autonomy that they grant to the welfare state, an issue
that is rarely treated by most theories of state's role in reproducing the labor force. Yet because the latter usually analyze
how labor is reproduced, they generally provide a more systematic analysis of the functions of specific social programs. It would
be wrong, therefore, to collapse these interpretations into one
"theory" of the welfare state. Despite their shared outlook, each
has its special emphases and concerns.
Homelessness and Social Policy
Thousands of homeless people have been helped by the policy developments of the 1980s. Without these developmentswithout the shelters, without the hotels, without the outreach
programs, many homeless would still be on the streets. This
reality should be noted and given its due weight. But other
perceptions intrude, for New York City did not merely address
a need: it sought to handle a social problem in a particular
economic and political context. This economic and political context was constraining, and these constraints permeated the making of social welfare policy even as that policy helped the
homeless.
This point is perhaps the real conclusion of this study. Although homelessness is a conspicuous problem whose very
prominence raises serious questions about the organization of
American society, the public sector does not have a free hand
in choosing its response. Rather, as this research shows, there
are constraints placed on its development of policy. Analyses of
homelessness should stress this fact. The homeless get some
benefits in order to defuse the most unsettling questions about
wealth and poverty. But they do not get more because a truly
adequate response would conflict with powerful forces in the
American political economy.
References
Barbanel, J. (1985, November 22). Mentally ill homeless: Policy at issue. The
New York Times, p. B-4.
Barbanel, J. (1987, November 23). New York shifts debate on homeless problem. The New York Times, p. A-1.

Homelessness
Barrow, S., & Lovell, A. (1982). Evaluation of Project Reach Out, 1981-82. New
York City: New York State Psychiatric Institute.
Barrow, S., & Lovell, A. (1982). Evaluationn of the referral of outreach clients
to mental health services, privateproprietary homes for adults, CSS eligibility,
and the acute day hospital. New York City: New York State Psychiatric
Institute.
Biber, J. (1984, March 17). Letter to The Nez York Times, p. A-22.
Block, F. (1977). The ruling class does not rule: Notes on the marxist theory
of the state. Socialist Revolution, 7, 6-28.
Coalition for the Homeless. (undated). Litigation-a chronological summary.
New York: Coalition for the Homeless.
Daley, S. (1987, January 27). record number given housing in city shelters.
The New York Times, p. B-2.
Dickinson, J., & Russell, B. (Eds.). (1986). Family, economy, & state: The social
reproduction process under capitalism. NY: St. Martin's.
Gough, I. (1979). The political economy of the welfare state. London: The
MacMillian Press, Ltd.
Hayes, R. (1985). The mayor and the homeless poor. City Limits, 10, 6-9.
Hopper, K., Baxter, E., Cox, S., & Klein, L. (1982). One year later. New York
City: Community Service Society.
Hopper, K. & Hamber, J. (1985). The making of America's homeless: From skid
row to the new poor, 1945-1984. NY: Community Service Society.
Hopper, K., & Cox, L. S. (1982). Litigation in advocacy for homeless: The
case of New York. Development: Seeds of Change, 2, 57-62.
Human Resources Administration. (1984). New York City plan for homeless
adults. New York City: Human Resources Administration.
Human-Resources Administration. (1986). Monthly shelter report. New York:
Human Resources Administration.
Koch, E. (1987). Toward a comprehensive policy on homelessness. New York
City: Mayor's Advisory Task Force on the Homeless.
Moscovitch, A. (1980). The boundaries of social policy. Catalyst: A Socialist
Journal of the Social Services, 6, 89-94.
New York City. (1986). New York City facilities plan for homeless individuals.
New York: New York City Human Resources Administration; Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Services;
Office of Management and Budget.
O'Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. NY: St. Martin's Press.
Schmalz, J. (1987, December 22). Housing for homeless families opens in
Brooklyn. The New York Times, p. B-3.
Shelter Employment Project. (1986). Determinants of success in the Shelter Employment Project. New York City: Human Resources Administration, Adult
Services Agency.
Skocpol, T. (1980). Political response to capitalist crisis: Neo-marxist theories
of the state and the case of the New Deal. Politics and Society. 10, 155201.
Valleau, Majorie. (1987). Jobs and housing helps shelter clients. Us: A Publication of the Human Resources Administration, 5(1), 4-5.

